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STATE OF PLAY OF EU’S SECURITY  
Factual situation:
 According to Eurobarometer for 2017, two major threats
were individualized by the EU public opinion:
 Migration crisis/refugee crisis (more than 2.6 million asylum
seekers, more than 2.100 fatalities in the Mediterranean only
in the first semester of 2017 (5.000 overall), suspension of
Schengen code/free movement of people has been
undermined)
 Terrorist attacks (12 with serious numbers of victims:
Barcelona 2017, London 2017, Manchester 2017, Paris 2017,
Stockholm 2017, Berlin 2016, Brussels 2016,Nice 2016, Paris
2015, etc.)
 In terms of priorities 3 most urgent measures need to be
tackled:
 1. combat terrorism and fight against terrorist groups
 2. fight against roots of terrorism and radicalization
 3. strengthen control of EU borders
Global Policy Framework for action:
 European Union Global Strategy on Security and
Defense (2016) (new set of capabilities: art.42 (7)
TEU (mutual defense clause) and art.222 (TFEU)
(solidarity clause)
 new Level of Ambition (2016)
 Implementation Plan on Security and Defense
(2016)
 European Defense Action Plan (2016)
 EU – NATO Joint Declaration (2016) (42 concrete
project proposals for actions)
 Launching of the Permanent Structured
Cooperation on Security (PESCO) as of June 22,
2017
EXTERNALIZATION OF EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY OUT 
OF EU BORDERS
DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
POLICY/EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY
 Security refers to the whole Internal and external
security nexus or better the continuum between
them (Mogherini, World Economic Forum:
Redefining Europe’s Security Agenda, Davos 2017),
in particular having in mind the migration-security
nexus and the development-nexus, and because
terrorism has become a transnational concern
 Reality about EU’s security: Soft power vs hard
power debate (Manners, Whitman, Keukeleire et
altri vs Aggestam, Hyde-Price, Merlingen et altri.)
 EU does not have the capacity to have a real CSDP
(due to treaty provisions, decision-making process,
budget (spending gap) and specific relations with
NATO)
EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE/EXTERNALIZATION 
 Several definitions:
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary: the action or process of
externalizing or something externalized/embodied
 Psychology (Freud): unconscious defense mechanism by
which an individual ‘projects’ his/her internal characteristics
onto the outside world
 European Foreign Policy (external governance): expanding
the scope of EU rules beyond EU borders (Lavanex &
Schimmelfennig, 2009) or it refers to a process of externalization
of its relevant internal policies to tackle threats before they
reach EU territory (Mounier, 2006)
 Italian NGO’s and academia jargon: giving in subcontract
border management of EU borders to third states (ARCI Report,
2016)
Externalization of EU Security out of EU borders, means pushing EU’s responsibility for 
its own security to third states/parties.(less complicated, less expensive and sustainable)
WHAT EYES DON’T SEE, THE HEART DOES NOT GREIVE
1. Security projection towards African
countries from Central Mediterranean
Route
2. Security projection towards Countries
from Eastern Mediterranean Route
(Turkey and Western Balkan countries)
TWO CASES ARE BEING EXAMINED IN RELATION TO EU’S EXTERNAL 
MIGRATION, ASYLUM AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY
QUESTION: How does the EU externalize it’s own security out of EU borders and how 
does it manage to push responsibility towards third states or parties?  
BASIC METHODS/INSTRUMENTS USED 
BY THE EU: 
1. Soft power tools (diplomatic,
political, economic, cultural,
developmental instruments)
1. General policies framework + legislative acts
2. External policy framework of the EU (enlargement,
neighborhood, development, trade, migration and asylum
policies)
3. Readmission agreements (readmission clause) + separate
cooperation agreements or readmission agreements between
EU Member states and interested countries
4. Technical assistance (reinforced border checks and use of new
technology), training local authorities and financial aid
5. Support and creation of refugee camps for asylum seekers in
transit countries
6. Creation of hotspots (points of registration and identification of
refugees with digital imprints within 48 (72) hours from arrival.
(until now only in Italy and Greece, but on the Summit meeting
in Paris (28 August 2017), it was discussed to open similar
centers/hotspots in Niger and Libya.
2. Hard power tools: civilian and 
military operations that support 
general policies
1. European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (2016) (FRONTEX)
2. EU Civilian and Military Operations
3. Joint EU/NATO operations
1. SECURITY PROJECTION TOWARDS AFRICAN COUNTRIES FROM CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN 
ROUTE (LYBIA, CIAD, NIGER, MORE IN GENERAL ACP COUNTRIES)
Soft power tools (non exhaustive List) :
 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 2005 (gives the basis for EU’s
relations with third countries), Migration Compact (2016) (tailor made
apprach with third countries integrating all EU policies, tools and
instrument (priority countries: Niger, Nigeria, Senegall, Mali, Ethiopia,
Lebanon and Jordan), The Karthoum process (EU-Horn of Africa
Migration Route Intitiative, 2014);
 Return Directive 2008/115/EC (Dec, 2008), Temporary Prootection
Directive 2001/55/EC (Jul, 2001), Policy Paper on Asylum (2011), etc.
 EU Development policy + EU Neighborhood Policy
 Coutounu agreement (2000) (art.13 (5(c)) contains the Readmission
clause; Individual readmission agreement between Italy and Tunis,
Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Egypt, and Cote D’Ivoire (that reporduce the
same agreementes as the one with Turkey)
 EU Africa Action plan – 1.8 billion Euro from the development
fund(Valetta Summit, 2015);
 Bilateral financial aid to countrries of interest (for ex. Lybia (Italy) – 100
milions Euro for protecting detention centers better border control,
 Other instruments.
Hard power tools: 
 Operation Marenostrum (2013 –
2014, Italy) (Search and Rescue) 
 Joint Operation Triton (2014 - ) 
(Search and Rescue)
 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia
(disrupt migrant smugglers and 
human traffickers) (2015 – 2018)
GENERAL PURPOSE: STRENGHTENING EU’S EXTERNAL BORDERS, MANAGING MIGRATION FLOWS 
AND CURBING MIGRANT ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION)
2. SECURITY PROJECTION TOWARDS COUNTRIES FROM THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
ROUTE (TURKEY AND WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES)
Soft power tools (non exhaustive list):
 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 2005 
(gives the basis for EU’s relations with third 
countries), European Agenda on Migration (2015)
 Return Directive 2008/115/EC (Dec, 2008), 
Temporary Prootection Directive 2001/55/EC (Jul, 
2001), Policy Paper on Asylum (2011), etc. 
 EU Enlargement Policy (the status of candidate or 
potential candidate states, visa liberalization, trade 
incentives etc.); 
 readmission agreements with Turkey (2014) and 
Western Balkan countries 
 EU Turkey action plan 20 March, 2016 (6 billion Euro)
Hard power tools:
 Deployment of European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency Mission to Bulgarian-Turkish border (Kapitan
Andreevo) (Oct, 2016)
 Joint Operation Triton (2014 - ) (Search and Rescue)
 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (disrupt migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers) (2015 – 2018)
 Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) (NATO) 
(reconnaissance surveillance tasks and 
rescue/detain people at sea)
 Posseidon Rapid Intervention (FRONTEX + NATO)
GENERAL PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING EU’S EXTERNAL BORDERS, MANAGING MIGRATION 
FLOWS AND CURBING MIGRANT ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION)
FACTS ABOUT MIGRATION FLOW (FRONTEX)
IS EXTERNALIZATION OF EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ORIENTED?
The facts are that:
• BY USING SOFT TOOLS:
1. Agreements are signed and cooperation is being established without taking into consideration the level of
respect for human rights (for ex. There have been several denunciation from report Amnesty international or
Human Rights Watch about the human rights situation in Libya, Niger, Ciad and other, or even Turkey. Even though
the EU has established a List of Safe Third Countries (Proposal for a Regulation of EP and Council (COM(2015) 452
final), the list itself is very doubtful.
2. Cotonou agreement (2000) (art.13 (5(c)) that contains the Readmission clause (seen for example thought the
prism of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), it imposes obligation to these countries
(especially Niger, Sudan and Cameroon) to close their own borders, which is in violation of the principles of free
movement of people of ECOWAS (basic international law principles)
3. Creating possible Hotspots in neighboring countries will be in violation of basic human rights law, principle of non-
refoulment and the right to claim asylum
• BY USING HARD TOOLS:
1. By deterring refugees from leaving Turkish or Libyan territorial waters or simply by returning them to the state of
transit or origin, refugees would be considered as they have never left the country’s territory, and this is a serious
violation of their right to claim asylum and it could be considered as a violation of the principle of non-refoulment.
(because of the doubtful safe list third countries) (Frelick, Bill, Human Rights Watch’s Refugee Program,2016)
2. Criminalization of migration (illicit trafficking with human beings by criminal state officials (especially in Libya as
denounced by International Human rights organizations)
TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: 
IS IT A MYTH OR REALITY? 
• IT IS REALITY because EU is using its tools of ‘remote control’ to limit the number of people able to
approach EU’s borders and seek asylum (Ruhrman & FitzGerald, 2016:5).(statistical data has show,
even though greater results have been achieved with Turkey than with African states).
• For example, from the soft power tools, by signing readmission agreements EU is creating buffer
zones and it is pushing security issues out of its neighboring states borders, because states that
signed the agreement would not want to take the burden of responsibility for refugees, they will
simply not let them pass/enter their territory. In that way the EU will capture and return migrant
before they reach/enter its borders.
• Another example from the hard power tools, by giving large autonomy to EU Mission EUNAFOR
MED, that is 1. gather information, seize smuggling vessels and 3. destroying them (destroyed 67
migrant vessels, and rescued/detained 5258 more migrants), this operation is considered to
become the first EU operation with a proactive potentially open coercive mandate (according to
EUISS), which is a qualitative shift in EU security policy towards peace enforcement and an
excellent deterrent to future migratory influx.
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